What does it mean to think queerly? David Ross Fryer's slim volume seeks to explore how we think ethically about identity through a reflexive discourse that selfconsciously explores how he constructs his queer critique of the problems and possibilities of an ethics of identity. Fryer is very clear that he is problematising both the idea of a queer approach to thinking as something distinctly delineated, and the idea of ethics and ethical thinking as conventionally articulated. What he seeks to avoid is apparent: a queer theory that undermines the identity politics through which lesbian and gay rights have formed and developed; and a sexual politics that retreats into conservative inclusionary aspirations and so loses any sense of the queer radicalism that should challenge and disrupt heteronormativity.
As the foregoing discussion suggests, the claimed coherence of the text is open to question. Whilst there are clear linkages made between successive chapters, and there is some sense of this extended reflexive essay following particular themes and ideas in exploring an ethics of identity, what is lost is a sense of balance and focus in the analysis. By the end of the text, whatever pleasure and provocation comes from the sum of parts frustrates in the sense that the parts are not necessarily developed and explored, particularly the main claims of the text.
The most critical feature of Fryer's thinking is a queer theory that arises from phenomenological rather than post-structuralist roots. The motivation behind this, thoroughly laudable, is to retain to critical insight of queer whilst not losing sight of the subject as more than a vessel for discursive It certainly has the potential attraction of theorizing contingency, the possible rebalancing of plasticity and fixidity and the balancing of an ethics of subjective making with an ethics of communal living within late modernity and its discursive and material contexts. It avoids the afoundationalism and endlessly transgressive claims of those who wish to take draw their queer theory from Foucault and post-structuralism and dissolve material inequality, oppression and injustice into discourse that reifies contingent subjectivity over normative social and political constraints. Yet here it is suggested rather than developed. A discussion of the merits and limits of Foucault and Butler that suggests that the phenomenological tradition from Husserl might offer a critical step forward is never really adequately developed, though its resonances through subsequent discussions of Levinas and Sartre are evident. What is needed is a more elaborated and exploratory treatment of the nature and consequences of this rethinking of queer theory that take in the phenomenological tradition in greater depth. Such a discusion may well have drawn from an extensive literature on embodiment, affect and subjectivism using such authors as Rosalyn Diprose, Rosi Braidotti, Cressida Heyes, Drucilla Cornell and others who have married post-structuralism, particularly Foucault, feminism and themes and ideas from the phenomenological. An extended discussion might also have traced the interplay of post-structuralist and phenomenological thinking and its relationship with psychoanalysis, which become the central focus of chapter four on the constructive synergy between phenomenology and psychoanalysis. This is not to say every theoretical reflection requires the backstory of western philosophy to be elaborated, and Fryer does represent this as a reflective exercise, but the lack of a sustained articulation of these ideas make the discussion, however thought-provoking, somewhat impressionistic. This is reinforced by Fryer's tendency to present his core concepts in a quite limited and unnuanced way -so his conception of normativity is drawn from psychoanalysis, and outlined as describing those dominant orthodox values in society such as heterosexuality and monogamy. where ethical practice might be oppositional. The problem with this conception is instantly recognisable as he specifically seeks to disassociate his criticisms of normativity as criticism of ethics. Yet this easy usages does tend to fall short when the question arises as to what post-normativity, for example, looks like, and the juxtaposition of psychoanalytic meanings in the context of philosophical-theoretical studies of queer and phenomenology is untidy. The claims for a post-human and post-normative positions seem to be little more than rejections of contemporary forms of oppression and fixidity without a deeper sense of what such terms might represent in and for themselves (hence the hyphen in this text). Again, Fryer does give a brief schematic of humanist (foundationalist), anti-humanist (anti-foundationalist) and post-humanist (within the tension between the two) positions as he defines them, but these sketches require considerably more development to underpin a phenomenological queer that sustains the human without either rooting them within orthodoxy and ideology or dissolving them into discourse.
These criticisms are not, as they might appear, simply scholarly dissatisfactions, though any text that initiates such a broad philosophical discussion with such trenchant claims opens itself up to such objections. The problem -and Fryer might not see it as a problem -is that whilst the limits of queer theory and identity politics as a basis of ethical conduct might be agreed, the practice and development of this new ethics of identity is elusive. Fryer might legitimately claim that the task of this ethical development has to be made within the subject, from their own engagement with the sort of synergistic observations he makes, for example, on phenomenology and psychoanalysis. The problem with that, however, is that if thinking queerly is an open-ended subjective process which can only be represented in this sort of reflective narrative that draws from western philosophy to make its subjective claims, the possibility for collective insight and mutual and reciprocal relations is rendered more difficult. As such, whilst Fryer has begun a dialogue for thinking more ethical relationships, his claims are provisional and underdeveloped.
Notwithstanding these criticisms, Fryer's text is an interesting exemplar in thinking queerly. What we see is how Fryer's different concerns coalesce and gestate towards critical insight. Fryer maps his terrain, presents his insights in gestation and applies them in theoretical reflection and literary criticism as application. Whilst incomplete it is also open-ended, and encourages the reader to think with Fryer on the central task of the text, which is how to think queerly towards ethical self-engagement and engagement with the other, where human relations are freed from orthodoxies which impede the constitution of free and ethical relationships. In this, for whatever criticisms can be raised, Fryer's insights are worth reading and reflecting upon.
